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Abstract. What is a model?  Surprisingly,  in philosophical  texts,  this  question is asked (sometimes), but 
almost never – answered. Instead of a general answer, usually, some classification of models is considered.  
The broadest possible definition of modeling could sound as follows: a model is anything that is (or could  
be) used, for some purpose, in place of something else. If the purpose is “answering questions”, then one has 
a  cognitive  model.  Could  such  a  broad  definition  be  useful?  Isn't  it  empty?  Can  one  derive  useful 
consequences from it? I'm trying to show that there is a lot of them.
Keywords:  model,  theory,  model  template,  model-based  picture  of  cognition,  Dappled  World,  limits  to 
modeling.
This article is written from an anti-Platonist point of view, according to which, mental structures 
and activities are considered to be parts of the physical Universe. It follows the program proposed 
in my paper Podnieks (2009).
What is a model?
Surprisingly,  in  philosophical  texts,  this  question  is  asked  (sometimes),  but  almost  never  – 
answered.  Instead of  a  general  answer,  usually,  some classification of  models  is  considered.  A 
general answer can't be found even in the prominent account given by Roman Frigg and Stephan 
Hartmann (2006). Should this mean that a sufficiently general definition of modeling is impossible?
Computer scientists are proposing very broad unified definitions of modeling since many years. 
For example, A* is a model of A, if one can use A* in place of A to answer questions about A. This  
very general definition of the term “model” was proposed by Marvin L. Minsky (1965, p. 45): 
“We use the term "model" in the following sense: To an observer B, an object A* is a model of an 
object A to the extent that B can use A* to answer questions that interest him about A. The model 
relation is inherently ternary. Any attempt to suppress the role of the intentions of the investigator B 
leads to circular definitions or to ambiguities about "essential features" and the like.”
A more  compact  definition  was  proposed  by  Jeff  Rothenberg (1989,  p.  75):  “Modeling  in  its 
broadest sense is the cost-effective use of something in place of something else for some purpose.”
It seems, philosophers are approaching a comparable level of generality only recently. For example:
Paul Teller (2001, p. 397): “... in principle, anything can be a model, and that what makes the thing 
a model is the fact that it is regarded or used as a representation of something by the model users. ...  
it  would be a mistake for the general account of the use of models in science to specify more 
narrowly what can function as a model.”
Mauricio Suarez (2004, p. 774): “[inf]: A represents B only if (i) the representational force of A 
points towards B, and (ii) A allows competent and informed agents to draw specific inferences 
regarding B.”
Ronald N. Giere (2010, p. 269): “... since just about anything can be used to represent anything else, 
there can be no unified ontology of models”.
Thus, the broadest possible definition of modeling could sound as follows: a model is anything that  
is (or could be) used, for some purpose, in place of something else. If the purpose is a kind of 
“answering questions”, then one has a cognitive model.
Could such a broad definition be useful? Isn't it empty? Can one derive useful consequences from 
it? 
According to the above definition, a model is a single concrete system replacing, for some purpose, 
another single concrete system (target system).
For example,  a  model of the Solar  system might  include:  a  specified number of planets (8),  a  
specified diameter and mass of Sun (1.4 x 106 km, 2.0 x 1020 kg), and for each planet: specified 
diameter, mass, initial location and velocity. No satellites, no asteroids, no Milky Way, no Universe.
To enable computer simulation, the Newtonian mechanics with the Gravitation law also should be 
included in  the  model  as  means  of  reasoning. Without  means of  reasoning included,  cognitive  
models would be useless semi-defined structures. Most of information contained in the model, is not 
represented explicitly. For example, at which moments, the 3rd, 4th and 5th planet will be located “on 
line”?  Thus,  one must  use some means of  reasoning to  answer non-trivial  questions  about  the 
model. And, only by answering questions about the model, one can try answering questions about 
the target system.
The “competent and informed agents” mentioned in the above definition by Suarez are allowed to 
use means of reasoning without formulating them explicitly.  Thus, different agents might apply 
different means of reasoning to the same model structure, obtaining possibly different results. To 
avoid this kind of confusion, I would propose to specify the allowed means of reasoning explicitly 
and always consider them as part of the model.
The model of an “arbitrary” system of  n planets, is  not a model in the above sense (it's a  model  
template, see below).
According to the above definition, models exist as independent systems. Hence, some models may 
exist before the modeling relation with the target system is established. For example, the design of a 
building is created before the building is built. And it is possible even that some designs will not be 
implemented at all. But, in principle, non-implemented designs don't differ from implemented ones. 
Thus, one can create and explore models that “aren't modeling” (currently, or at all), but are similar 
to  some  “modeling  models”.  “Non-modeling  models”  can  be  obtained  also  by  modifying  the 
“modeling” ones. Thus, virtual realities used in computer games, dreams and even hallucinations 
can be regarded (and best understood!) as models. And thus, the addition of “or could be” in the 
above definition of modeling is fully justified.
In some situations, the modeling relation may be  reflexive (“target system is the best model of 
itself”), but not for all purposes. For example, direct experimenting with the target system may be 
too  expensive,  too  dangerous,  or  impossible  at  all  –  as  put  by Jeff  Rothenberg (1989,  p.  78). 
Similarly, in some situations, the modeling relation may be symmetric and transitive, but again – not 
for all purposes.
Role of models in cognition
For an elaborated model-based picture of cognition see Carlos Hernandez et al. (2008, Section 4).
The ultimate purpose of cognition is knowing how to handle concrete systems surrounding us. Even 
when trying to reconstruct the history of the Universe we intend obtaining a useful knowledge for 
everyday practice. Thus, models as concrete replacements of “concrete systems surrounding us” are 
the  central  element  of  cognition.  Building  and  exploring  of  models  is  the  ultimate  phase of 
cognition.
This simplifies greatly the picture of cognition.  All we need are models, means allowing to build  
and explore models, means allowing to create means allowing to build and explore models, etc.  
Various  other  products  of  cognition  (languages,  logics,  ontologies,  theories,  laws,  methods, 
paradigms, ideologies, etc.) are useful only to the extent they allow for better building and exploring 
of models.
Any activities of human mind can be best understood as modeling. 
Role of theories
What should be the role of theories in this picture of cognition? None of theories is modeling a 
single concrete system. Thus, theories are not models. Newtonian mechanics is not a model, but it 
allows for building of models of various concrete mechanical systems. Could you imagine a good 
theory that merely “explains the world”, but does not help in building of good models and exploring 
them?
Thus, in this (model-based) picture of cognition, theories are useful only as means of building and  
exploring models. Theories are best understood as "The Toolbox of Science" – as put by Mauricio 
Suarez and Nancy Cartwright (2008).
Model templates 
Between  models  and theories,  there  is  an  important  intermediate  concept  that  is  called  model  
template by computer scientists. The term “parametric model” also would be appropriate. 
A model template is  a structure containing parameters.  By setting these parameters to  concrete 
values, we obtain models (instances of the template). The above-mentioned “arbitrary” system of n 
planets is a model template having as parameters: n – the number of planets, D, M – diameter and 
mass of the central body, di, mi – diameter and mass of i-th planet, etc. Newtonian mechanics with 
the Gravitation law are included in the template  as  means of reasoning.  By setting parameters 
appropriately (n=8 etc.) we can obtain, for example, a computer simulation of Solar system.
Some theories can be represented almost entirely as model templates. For example, the Hamiltonian 
formulation  of  Newtonian  mechanics  can  be  regarded  as  a  model  template  of  an  arbitrary 
mechanical  system having  6n+2 parameters:  n –  the number  of  components,  H –  Hamiltonian 
function  of  the  system,  and  6n initial  coordinates  and  impulses.  Quantum mechanics  allows  a 
similar formulation in terms of parametric quantum systems. Thus, some theories are “models” 
indeed – but parametric models.
The  so-called  London  model  of  super-conductivity  analyzed  by  Mauricio  Suarez and  Nancy 
Cartwright (2008) also is a model template, and not a model in the above sense. 
The idea that some theories are, in fact, model templates can be found already in Ronald N. Giere  
(1979).  See  also Ronald  N.  Giere  (1985),  where  on p.  78 model  templates  are  called  general  
models.
Less organized modeling...
Model templates generated by a single theory represent, in a sense, the “homogeneous” or “strictly 
organized” extreme of model-building.
Less organized cases of model-building are discussed, for example, by Mauricio Suarez and Nancy 
Cartwright (2008). Namely, when building models, people are applying not only accepted theories 
in a regular way. As put by Suarez and Cartwright, sometimes they introduce ad hoc assumptions 
that “do not follow from theory either by de-idealisation or by introducing otherwise acceptable 
descriptions of the facts” (p. 70). One may use assumptions with no theory behind, or, what Suarez 
and Cartwright are calling “piecemeal borrowing” (p. 73) – applying the results of theories out of 
their regular context.  
Piecemeal borrowing, and even applying of ad hoc combinations of entire theories is, in a sense, the 
“heterogeneous” extreme of model-building. The Millennium Simulation Project performed by The 
Virgo Consortium represents  a  striking  example  of  this  kind  –  as  argued by  Stephanie  Ruphy 
(2008).
Precision of modeling
Since models are independent systems, their potential of answering questions about target systems 
(“precision of modeling”) may be limited.
The  simplest  kind  of  models  is  obtained  from  target  systems  by  applying  various  kinds  of 
simplification  (omission,  abstraction,  linearization,  other  kinds  of  idealization,  etc.).  When 
compared to target systems, such models may contain deliberate deformations.
But  as  independent  systems,  models  may  possess  also  –  when  compared  to  target  systems  – 
“excessive” properties. Consider, for example, rats as model organisms used to test human drugs.
But,  in a sense,  the most advanced kind of models is produced by physicists.  Most of modern 
physical models – starting already with Ptolemy, Copernicus and Kepler – are not “derived” from 
experimental data, they are almost pure inventions of human mind. As put by Albert Einstein (1930) 
on the occasion of 300th death anniversary of Kepler:
"It seems that the human mind has first to construct forms independently, before we can find them 
in things. Kepler’s marvelous achievement is a particularly fine example of the truth that knowledge 
cannot spring from experience alone, but only from the comparison of the inventions of the intellect 
with observed fact." – an English translation from Bruce Director (2006).
In physics, the distance between theoretical constructs (such as, for example, quarks, or Big Bang) 
and their “points of confirmation” may be considerable.
Limits to modeling 
Now, the main point: there are systems that can't be modeled in full detail even in principle.
For example, how much of the Universe can be captured in a single model? How detailed can be a 
simulatable computer model of the Universe? Could it simulate  every photon and  every neutrino 
traveling across the Universe? Could this  model include the model of the simulating computer 
itself?
Laplace  was  aware  of  this  problem:  in  1812  he  concluded  that  despite  having  a  “Theory  of 
Everything” (Newtonian mechanics with the Gravitation law), we will never be able to predict the 
future in every detail: “... our efforts will always fall infinitely short of this mark”  – an  English 
translation from Kevin D. Hoover (2001, p. 101).
But, contrary to Laplace, the impossibility of such detailed models is caused not by the (actual, or 
future)  limitations  of human minds or technical resources.  The  limitation is  built  into the very  
principle of modeling: we are trying to replace some system by another one. In full detail, this may 
be impossible. And this limitation is “built” into the very structure of the physical Universe. Very 
detailed models of the Universe simply can't exist... in the Universe – at least, as we know it today.  
Of course, this conviction represents a metaphysical hypothesis about “how the world really is”. 
How much of the Universe can be captured by a tiny fragment of it?
Are there systems, that are much smaller than the Universe, but for which detailed models also can't 
exist in the Universe? Which of the systems are “too unique” to be modeled in full detail?
Thus, it makes sense trying to determine the limiting conditions, behind which a detailed modeling 
becomes impossible. Let's ask the following question: for which values of N, two physical systems 
each consisting of N “separable components” can't be “isomorphic enough” to represent each other 
in every detail (whatever all that means)?
Let's denote by L the least such N, and let's call it Laplace's constant. My hypothesis:
1019 ≤ L ≤ 1022.
Indeed, could we build 106 computers each having a terabyte (i.e. 1013 bit) hard disk, store identical 
terabytes of data, and start identical programs on them. Hence, it seems, L≥1019?
To “prove” L ≤ 1022, let's consider an isolated container containing one liter of air. How detailed 
can be a simulatable computer model of such a system? If we believe that air consists of molecules, 
then our container includes about 1022 molecules. Thus, to represent the state of this system at a 
particular moment of time, we need to store at least 6 x 1022 numbers (coordinates and velocities). 
And to simulate the evolution of this state in real time, we need to compute – at a very high speed –  
the  solutions  of  6  x  1022 Hamiltonian  equations.  (If,  instead  of  a  classical  model,  we will  try 
building a quantum mechanical one, this won't decrease the number of details necessary to represent 
precisely “this particular one liter of air”.)
We can't build such a computer. Moreover – such a computer can't exist in the Universe! Because 
(my metaphysical hypothesis), in the Universe,  two systems each consisting of 1022 “separable  
components” simply can't be “isomorphic enough” to represent each other in every detail! No two 
identical liters of air can exist in the Universe! Hence, it seems, L ≤ 1022?
So, let's establish “Laplace Prize” for determining the exact value of L?
Of course, too large a number of “separable components” is not the only obstacle to a detailed 
modeling.  The  impossibility  of  determining  precisely  enough  of  various  parameters  (masses, 
coordinates, velocities etc.) is the next one. And, when trying to model complex social systems, the 
network of different “laws” to be implemented in the model, becomes too complicated, making 
model-based prediction impossible, as argued by Michael Batty and Paul M. Torrens (2001).
The Dappled World perspective refined
The Dappled World perspective was introduced by Nancy Cartwright (1999, p. 1): “... we live in a 
world rich in different things,  with different natures,  behaving in different ways.  The laws that 
describe this world are a patchwork, not a pyramid.”
For me, it isn't a metaphysical hypothesis about “how the world really is”. Because there is no such 
thing as “laws of nature” – again, as put by Nancy Cartwright (1983, p. 129): “My basic view is that 
fundamental equations do not govern objects in reality; they only govern objects in models.” 
A similar formulation is attributed to Niels Bohr: "There is no quantum world. There is only an 
abstract quantum physical description. It is wrong to think the task of physics is to find out how 
nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature." – quoted after David Favrholdt (1994, p. 
92).
Thus, there are no “laws of nature”, there are only laws implemented in models, and hence, it is 
only our world picture, that may be “dappled”, or not. For me, the Dappled World perspective is a 
hypothesis about how our world picture is and always will be.
The above-mentioned limitations to modeling represent an argument in favor of the Dappled World 
perspective: neither robots, nor humans can hope to create a single model for extensive parts of 
its/his/her environment. At the model level, we will always have only a patchwork of models each  
very restricted in its application scope.
But at the level of theories, i.e. at the level of means of model-building-exploring? Will we have,  
some time, a single complete Theory of Everything (or, at least, a complete pyramid of theories) not 
only “explaining everything in the world”, but also allowing, without any additional postulates, to 
generate all the models we may need? According to the Dappled World perspective, the answer is 
negative.
The above two negative theses represent a refinement of the Dappled World perspective.
A model template does exist, but its instances don't?
Now, a possible Platonist objection: the above-mentioned detailed models of systems containing 
1022 separable components do not exist in the physical Universe, but we can imagine them! There 
are “imagined systems” that “would be physical things if they were real” – as put by Roman Frigg 
(2010, p. 253).
But how could one imagine a computer simulation of 1022 molecules, when such computers can't 
exist in the Universe even in principle? For an anti-Platonist, this means that, in fact, one is using 
some mathematical axioms to derive the “existence” of such an impossibly huge computer. Indeed, 
even the axioms of first order arithmetic would suffice to prove, for any N, the “existence” of a 
computer having a 10N bit storage device. But almost all of that is far beyond what can exist in the 
physical Universe!
What really exist in the physical Universe, are definitions of model templates – because they can be 
written down on a paper. For example, one can write down a definition of the following model 
template: an isolated container containing the so-called hard-ball-gas having as parameters: n – the 
number of spherical molecules; dimensions of the container; and for each molecule: diameter, mass, 
initial location and velocity. The Hamiltonian function of this system is defined as a simple sum of  
kinetic and potential energies of molecules, assuming elastic collisions. This model template written 
down on a paper exists in the physical Universe in the most solid sense possible.
But, if we set n=1022, then there is no real way of assigning particular values even to the initial 
coordinates and velocities of each hard-ball molecule. Thus, while the model template itself does 
exist in the physical Universe, for n=1022, its  instances don't – they “exist” only according to the 
axioms used for theoretical analysis of the template.
What could be done in such a situation?
At the model level, we can try computer simulation only of very small models of hard-ball gas 
containers: for  n=103, 104 etc. For impressive educational programs of this kind see  Paul Falstad 
(2009:  Gas  Molecules Simulation  ) and John I. Gelder et al. (2000:  Chemistry Web Server). For a 
research application involving such simulations – see Yakov G. Sinai et al. (2008). It appears that 
even for  such small  amounts  of  molecules,  for  example,  the  observed (model!)  distribution  of 
velocities is similar to the well-known Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution.  
But,  perhaps,  the  most  striking  “small”  simulation  experiment  of  this  kind  –  The  Millennium 
Simulation  Project was  performed  by  The  Virgo  Consortium.  The  simulated  Universe  of  this 
experiment consists of about 1010 big gravitating “particles” (each about 109 solar masses in the 
first simulation, and about 107 – in the second one). Trillion times less details – when compared to 
one liter of air! 
And, at the level of theory? 
For realistic numbers of molecules, most particular instances of the hard-ball gas model templates 
are not accessible to analysis. But one can try proving  general theorems about  all instances, or 
about large (but simply definable) sets of them. One can try calculating various average properties 
over these sets of instances.  This is exactly what is going on in statistical mechanics since Gibbs 
introduced the so-called microcanonical ensemble!
Thanks to Kaspars Balodis, Alvis Brazma and Martins Opmanis for critical comments.
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